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Just before noon on December 25, 2009, Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, a 23-year-old
Nigerian man, tried to detonate a bomb on a Northwest flight from Amsterdam to Detroit
carrying 278 passengers.1 Fortunately, the device malfunctioned; although it caused a fire, the
airplane did not explode.2 The man, dubbed the Christmas Day Bomber ("CDB") by the media,
was subdued by other passengers and arrested when the plane landed in Detroit.3 FBI agents
questioned him for approximately fifty minutes and he was reportedly cooperating.4 The
questioning was stopped to give him medical treatment for the burns he had sustained; when
he returned he was given Miranda warnings and refused to answer any further questions.5 In
response to criticism, the Attorney General said that the officers questioning the CDB were
legally required to give him Miranda warnings. 6
Were they required to do so? Are law enforcement officers required to give terrorists the
warnings set forth by the Supreme Court in Miranda? This paper suggests several lines of
reasoning that might have led government officials to question the Christmas Day Bomber
without giving him Miranda warnings and might lead government officials in future cases to
question terrorists apprehended while attempting an attack without Miranda warnings.
II. THE PUBLIC SAFETY EXCEPTION
In New York v. Quarles, decided in 1984, the United States Supreme Court established a
"public safety" exception to Miranda. 7 In that case, a woman approached police officers and
told them she had just been raped.8 She described the man who had raped her, and told the
Malvina Halberstam is a professor of law at the Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva University.
She served as an Assistant District Attorney in New York County and as Counselor on International Law in
the U.S. Department of State, Office of the Legal Adviser. The author would like to thank Ann-Margret
Gidley, Cardozo 2012, for her assistance with the research for this paper. An earlier version of this paper was
presented at a conference on Lawfare: The Use of Law as a Weapon of War, held at the New York County
Lawyer's Association, March 11, 2010.
1 Anahad O'Connor & Eric Schmitt, Terror Attempt Seen as Man Tries to Ignite Device on Jet, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 25, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/26/us/26plane.html.
2 Id.
3 Id.
4 See Abdulmutallab in 50 Minutes, WALL ST. J., Jan. 26, 2010, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100
01424052748703808904575025231056290438.html.
5 See Richard Serrano & David Savage, Officials OKd Miranda Warning for Accused Airline Plotter, L.A. TIMES,
Feb. 2, 2010, http://articles.latimes.com/2010/feb/01 /nation/la-na-terror-miranda 1-201 OfebO 1.
6 Letter from Att'y Gen. Eric Holder to Mitch McConnell, U.S. S. Minority Leader (Feb. 3, 2010) [hereinafter
Holder Letter], available at http://www.justice.gov/cjs/docs/ag-letter-2-3-10.pdf.
7 467 U.S. 649, 655-56 (1984).
8 Id. at 651.
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officers that he ran into a supermarket nearby and that he had a gun. 9 The officers went with
the woman to the supermarket and saw someone fitting the description she had given. 10 When
the suspect saw the officer, he ran to the back of the supermarket and the officer gave chase.11
He apprehended the suspect, frisked him, and discovered that he was wearing an empty
shoulder holster. 12 After he handcuffed the suspect, the officer asked him where the gun was. 13
The suspect responded, "the gun is over there," pointing in the direction of some empty
cartons. 14
The New York Court of Appeals ruled that the statement and gun were inadmissible
because the defendant had not been given Miranda warnings. 15 The United States Supreme
Court reversed. 16 The Court stated: " [W]e conclude today that there are limited circumstances
where the judicially imposed strictures of Miranda are inapplicable."" "We believe that this case
presents a situation where concern for public safety must be paramount to adherence to the
literal language of the prophylactic rules enunciated in Miranda." 18 "We do not believe that the
doctrinal underpinnings of Miranda require that it be applied in all its rigor to a situation in which
police officers ask questions reasonably prompted by a concern for the public safety." 19
Applying these principles to the case before it, the Court said,
The police in this case, in the very act of apprehending a suspect, were confronted with
the immediate necessity of ascertaining the whereabouts of a gun which they had every
reason to believe the suspect had just removed from his empty holster and discarded in
the supermarket. So long as the gun was concealed somewhere in the supermarket, with
its actual whereabouts unknown, it obviously posed more than one danger to the public
safety: an accomplice might make use of it, a customer or employee might later come
upon it.
In such a situation, if the police are required to recite the familiar Miranda warnings before
asking the whereabouts of the gun, suspects in Quarles' position might well be deterred
from responding. Procedural safeguards which deter a suspect from responding were
deemed acceptable in Miranda in order to protect the Fifth Amendment privilege; when
the primary social cost of those added protections is the possibility of fewer convictions,
the Miranda majority was willing to bear that cost. Here, had Miranda warnings deterred
Quarles from responding to Officer Kraft's question about the whereabouts of the gun, the
cost would have been something more than merely the failure to obtain evidence useful
in convicting Quarles. Officer Kraft needed an answer to his question not simply to make
his case against Quarles but to insure that further danger to the public did not result from
the concealment of the gun in a public area.
We conclude that the need for answers to questions in a situation posing a threat to the
public safety outweighs the need for the prophylactic rule protecting the Fifth
Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination. We decline to place officers such as
Officer Kraft in the untenable position of having to consider, often in a matter of seconds,
9 Id. at 651-52.
i





15 People v. Quarles, 58 N.Y. 2d 665, 666 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1982), rev'd, 467 U.S. 649 (1984).
16 Quarles, 467 U.S. 649.
17 Id. at 653.
i
8 /d.
19 Id. at 656.
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whether it best serves society for them to ask the necessary questions without the Miranda
warnings and render whatever probative evidence they uncover inadmissible, or for them
to give the warnings in order to preserve the admissibility of evidence they might uncover
but possibly damage or destroy their ability to obtain that evidence and neutralize the
volatile situation confronting them. 20
Given that in the past al Qaeda attacks have involved several attacks simultaneously or
in close proximity - the 9/11 attacks, 21 the London subway attacks, 22 the Spanish train attackS 23
- the likelihood that other airplanes were in danger of being blown up was at least as great as
the likelihood that an accomplice might make use of the gun, or that a customer or store
employee might later find the gun (and presumably hurt himself or others accidently) in the
Quarles case.
And, "if the police are required to recite the familiar Miranda warnings before asking"
about other attacks planned or in progress, a suspect in the CDB's position "might well be
deterred from responding," 24 as he in fact was.25 While there might be some question about the
danger posed in the Quarles case, as was strongly argued by the dissent,26 there can be no
question that there was a real danger that similar attacks on other airplanes were planned or
even in progress when the CDB was arrested. And, in Justice Rehnquist's words, here, too, "had
Miranda warnings deterred" the CDB "from responding ... the cost would have been something
more than merely the failure to obtain evidence useful in convicting" him. 27 How many lives
might have been saved if one of the 9/11 hijackers had been apprehended and questioned
before the attacks? Should law enforcement officials have been required to give him Miranda
warnings and take the risk that he would refuse to talk? It would be difficult to find a clearer case
for the application of the public safety exception than a terrorist apprehended as he was about
to or in the process of committing an attack.
III. MIRANDA
Although it is frequently stated that law enforcement officials are required to give
Miranda warnings before questioning a suspect in custody, it is not a violation of Miranda for
police to question a suspect without first giving him the warnings set forth in that case.28 It is only
20 Id. at 657-58 (emphasis added).
21 See THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT: FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS ON THE UNITED STATES
1-35 (W.W. Norton & Co. 2004), available at http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/ report/911Report.pdf
(discussing the terrorist attacks on the United States of September 11, 2001).
22 COULD 7/7 HAVE BEEN PREVENTED? REVIEW OF THE INTELLIGENCE ON THE LONDON TERRORIST ATTACKS ON 7 JULY 2005 13-14
(2009), available at http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/sites/default/files/resources/20090519_77review.pdf
(discussing the bombing of London's public transportation system on July 7, 2005).
23 See Madrid Train Attacks, BBC NEWS, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/spl/hi/guides/457000/457031/html/
(last visited Nov. 30, 2010). See also Atentados Terroristas Del Dial l De Marzo De 2004 En Madrid [Terrorist
Attacks of March 11, 2004 in Madrid] Central Criminal Court of Spain Summary Number 20/2004 1,6 (2004),
http://www.elmundo.es/documentos/2006/04/11/autohtml/index.html?cual= 1 (discussing the bombings of
four commuter trains in Madrid on March 11, 2004).
24 See Quarles, 467 U.S. at 657.
25 Warren Richey, Holder Letter: Why We Read Christmas Day Bomber His Rights, THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
(Feb. 2, 2010), http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Justice/2010/0203/Holder-letter-why-we-read-Christmas-
Day-bomber-his-rights; see O'Conner and Schmitt, supra note 1.
26 Quarles, 467 U.S. at 674-78 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
27 See id. at 657.
28 United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630, 641 (2004) (plurality opinion).
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a violation to use the incriminating statements in evidence against him at trial. 29 The Supreme
Court has stated in many cases that Miranda is a prophylactic rule30 designed to protect the
Fifth Amendment provision that no one shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. The
violation of the Fifth Amendment occurs at trial, not when the questions are asked. 31 However,
the right not to be compelled to testify at trial would be of little value if the person could be
compelled to answer questions before trial and the answers could be used against him at trial. 3 2
Therefore, the Supreme Court long ago held that to be admissible at trial, a pre-trial confession
must be voluntary.33 Miranda goes one step further: it prohibits the use at trial of any
incriminating statement by the defendant unless police inform him prior to questioning him that
"he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence
against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or
appointed." 34 The purpose of the warnings is "to dispel the compelling atmosphere of the
interrogation." 35
Thus, questioning someone without first giving the warnings set forth in Miranda is not a
violation of the law; the violation is the use of the answers to incriminate him at the trial.3 6 In this
respect, the Fourth and Fifth Amendments are very different. Although the exclusionary rule
applies to both, a violation of the Fourth amendment occurs at the time of search; a violation of
the Fifth Amendment occurs when the evidence is used in court.37 This difference stems from the
difference in the language of the two amendments.
The Fourth Amendment provides, "The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated . .
. ."38 The Fifth Amendment provides, in pertinent part, [N]or shall [any person] be compelled in
any criminal case to be a witness against himself . . . ."39 A search that is "unreasonable," or
without a warrant in situations where a warrant is required, violates the Fourth Amendment
regardless of whether the evidence is used at trial or not.4 0 The Fifth Amendment is only violated
29 Id.
30 See, e.g., id. at 636; Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 770 (2003) (plurality opinion); Duckworth v. Eagan,
492 U.S. 195, 203 (1989); Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 439 (1974).
31 Patone, 542 U.S. at 641 ("A mere failure to give Miranda warnings does not, by itself, violate a suspect's
constitutional rights or even the Miranda rule ... potential violations occur, if at all, only upon the admission
of unwarned statements into evidence at trial."); see also United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259,
264 (1990) ("A constitutional violation occurs only at trial.').
32 See Patane, 542 U.S. at 632.
33 See Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 542-43 (1897) (" [A] confession, in order to be admissible, must be
free and voluntary: that is, must not be extracted by any sort of threats or violence, nor obtained by any
direct or implied promises, however slight, nor by the exertion of any improper influence.").
34 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 479 (1966).
35 Id. at 465.
36 See Patane, 542 U.S. at 641 (2004).
37 See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 354 (1974); see also United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494
U.S. 259, 264 (1990) ("The privilege against self-incrimination guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment is a
fundamental trial right.. .a constitutional violation occurs only at trial." (citing Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1
(1964))).
38 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
39 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
40 See e.g., Calandra, 414 U.S. at 354 (holding that unreasonable government intrusions are "fully
accomplished by the original search without probable cause.").
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by the use of the "compelled" testimony at trial.41 The Supreme Court has emphasized this
distinction in a number of cases. For example, in the Verdugo case, the Court said:
[T]he Fourth Amendment ... operates in a different manner than the Fifth Amendment
. . [A] constitutional violation [of the Fifth Amendment] occurs only at trial .... The Fourth
Amendment functions differently. It prohibits 'unreasonable searches and seizures'
whether or not the evidence is sought to be used in a criminal trial, and a violation of the
Amendment is 'fully accomplished' at the time of an unreasonable governmental
intrusion. 42
In Quarles, Justice O'Connor, who concurred in part and dissented in part, stated, "The
harm caused by failure to administer Miranda warnings relates only to admission of testimonial
self-incriminations . . . ."43 Justice Marshall, who dissented, was even more emphatic that
questioning a suspect without giving him Miranda warnings is not a violation of the Fifth
Amendment or of Miranda:
The irony of the majority's decision is that the public's safety can be perfectly well
protected without abridging the Fifth Amendment. If a bomb is about to explode or the
public is otherwise imminently imperiled, the police are free to interrogate suspects without
advising them of their constitutional rights. Such unconsented questioning may take place
. . .when police officers ... believe that advising a suspect of his constitutional rights might
decrease the likelihood that the suspect would reveal life-saving information .... [NJothing
in the Fifth Amendment or our decision in Miranda v. Arizona proscribes this sort of
emergency questioning. All the Fifth Amendment forbids is the introduction of coerced
statements at trial.44
This was not changed by the Supreme Court decision in Dickerson,45 which characterized
Miranda as a "constitutional rule." 46 In United States v. Patane, decided after Dickerson, the
Court said, " [A] mere failure to give Miranda warnings does not, by itself, violate a suspect's
constitutional rights or even the Miranda rule." 47
Generally, law enforcement officers give Miranda warnings because they want to be
able to use the defendant's statement in court to convict him. In the case of the CDB, who was
caught red-handed, his incriminating statements were probably not even needed to convict
him. 48 Moreover, in the usual criminal case, conviction is the main goal. However, in the case of
a terrorist who is a member of a group such as al Qaeda, getting information about the terrorist
organization, or other terrorist acts that are being planned, may be far more important than
convicting any one terrorist. It might, therefore, be necessary to question him even where the
other evidence is not overwhelming.
41 See Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 767 (2003) (plurality opinion) (" [I]t is not until [the use of compelled
testimony] in a criminal case that a violation of the Self-Incrimination Clause occurs." (citing Brown v.
Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 286 (1936); Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 264)).
42 Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 264.
43 New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 669 (1984).
44 Id. at 686 (emphasis added).
45 Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000).
46 Id. at 444 ('In sum, we conclude that Miranda announced a constitutional rule that Congress may not
supersede legislatively.").
47 542 U.S. 630, 641 (2004) (plurality opinion). The Court further stated, " [P]olice do not violate a suspect's
constitutional rights (or the Miranda rule) by negligent or even deliberate failures to provide the suspect
with the full panoply of warnings prescribed by Miranda." Id.
48 See O'Connor & Schmitt, supra note 1.
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In response to a letter from Senator Mitch McConnell, the Senate minority leader, (joined
by other Senators), 49 Attorney General Eric Holder wrote, "both before and after 9/11, the
consistent, well-known, lawful, and publicly-stated policy of the FBI has been to provide Miranda
warnings prior to any custodial interrogation conducted inside the United States."50 He went on
to say that the FBI manual for Domestic FBI Operations "provides explicitly that ... [w]ithin the
United States, Miranda warnings are required to be given prior to custodial interviews . . . ."51 The
implication of the Attorney General's letter and of the FBI Manual appears to be that FBI agents
are legally required to give Miranda warnings prior to interrogation. 52 As noted earlier,
questioning a suspect without giving Miranda warnings is not a violation of the Fifth Amendment
or of Miranda. Only use of incriminating statements elicited as a result of such interrogation is a
violation of Miranda. 53 The provision in the FBI handbook apparently reflects a policy decision by
the Justice Department to require FBI agents to give Miranda warnings before questioning a
suspect in order to ensure that any incriminating statements elicited are admissible at the trial. 5 4
Its application to interrogation of terrorists, particularly those believed to be affiliated with a
terrorist organization such as al Qaeda, needs to be reconsidered.
The letter from Mr. Holder also quotes, in a footnote, a section from the FBI Legal
Handbook for Special Agents:
The warning and waiver of rights is not required when questions which are reasonably
prompted by a concern for public safety are asked. For example, if Agents make an arrest
in public shortly after the commission of an armed offense, and need to make an
immediate inquiry to determine the location of the weapon, such questions may be
asked, even of an in-custody suspect, without first advising the suspect of [his Miranda
rights].66
While this is correct, it conveys the impression that the public safety exception is limited to
very brief questioning immediately after the arrest. Although that was the situation in the Quarles
case, the reasoning of the case is not so limited. Quarles permits use of evidence obtained by
questioning a suspect without giving Miranda warnings, whenever "concern for public safety
must be paramount to adherence to the literal language of the prophylactic rules enunciated in
Miranda."5 6 Reasonably interpreted, questioning a terrorist - especially one captured in the
process of committing, or about to commit, an attack - without Miranda warnings does not bar
use of evidence thus obtained at trial, as long as it is plausible to believe the suspect has
information that might avert another terrorist attack.
49 Letter to Att'y Gen. Eric Holder from GOP Sens. Kit Bond, Susan Collins, Jeff Sessions, & John McCain,
available at http://sessions.senate.gov/public/index.cfm? FuseAction= PressShop. NewsReleases&
ContentRecordid=7066ef42-Ocf 1-49d1 -5dc3-2055844d365e.
so Holder Letter, supra note 6.
51 Id.
52 See FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, LEGAL COUNSEL DIVISION, FBI Legal Handbook for Special Agents
[hereinafter FBI Legal Handbook], § 7-2 (rev. 2003), available at http://foia.fbi.gov/filelink.htmlfile=/
legal-handbook spec-agent/legal-handbooks_spec-agent.pdf.
53 See United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630, 641 (2004) (plurality opinion) (" [A] mere failure to give Miranda
warnings does not, by itself, violate a suspect's constitutional rights or even the Miranda rule ... potential
violations occur, if at all, only upon the admission of unwarned statements into evidence at trial."); see also
United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 264 (1990) (" [A] constitutional violation occurs only at
trial.'').
54 See FBI Legal Handbook, § 7-3.2(6).
5s Holder Letter, supra note 6, n.2 (quoting FBI Legal Handbook, §7-2).
56 New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 653 (1984).
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In hearings before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, in response to a
question by Senator Snowe, FBI Director Robert S. Mueller Ill testified,
[I]n the initial interview, we had to determine whether there were other bombs on the
plane, whether there were other airplanes that had similar attacks contemplated [sic],
wanted to understand who the bomb maker was, who had directed him. All of that came
in the first series of questions.5 7
Following that initial questioning, Mr. Mueller testified, the CDB was given Miranda
warnings.58 When Senator Snowe persisted, "I don't understand why we'd want to issue the
Miranda rights when we're worried about whatever other subsequent events that might be
occurring,"5 9 Mr. Mueller replied, "Because we also want to utilize his statements to effectively
prosecute him." 60
Implicit in this answer are two assumptions:
1. The public safety exception did not apply to any questioning after the initial
questioning, and
2. Obtaining evidence that could be used to prosecute him was more important
than gathering further intelligence.
Neither assumption is necessarily correct. The first cannot be assessed without knowing
what information the FBI agents had obtained in the initial questioning. For example, were they
absolutely sure that no other attacks were being planned? If not, then at least arguably, further
questioning was necessary to ensure public safety and any statements elicited without Miranda
warnings would be admissible. The second - that obtaining admissible evidence was more
important than the intelligence that might be acquired by further questioning - seems to be
clearly wrong in this case, given the numerous witnesses to the attempted attack.
The FBI Manual and Guidelines should be amended to make clear: (1) that Miranda
does not prohibit interrogation without first providing the warnings, but only the use of the
evidence obtained without Miranda warnings at trial; (2) that in the case of terrorist attacks, the
evidence obtained might be admissible even if no Miranda warnings were given under the
public safety exception; (3) that whether to give Miranda warnings in situations where it is
believed the public safety exception would not apply is a policy decision that should be made
by weighing the need for intelligence that might be acquired by questioning the suspect
against the need to use any incriminating statement he might make at trial; and (4) that, if time
permits, those decisions should be made by the Attorney General and the Director of National
Intelligence, or someone specifically designated by them for that purpose, not the agent who
happens to be at the scene.
57 Current and Projected National Security Threats to the United States: Hearing Before the S. Select Comm.
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IV. GRAND JURY
The Fifth Amendment protects against self-incrimination.61 It does not protect against
incriminating others.62 A witness can be legally compelled to give evidence that incriminates
others, either at trial or before a Grand Jury. 63 If he refuses to do so, he can be held in contempt
and imprisoned. 64 There is no requirement that a witness called before a Grand Jury be given
Miranda warnings.65 The Justice Department could convene an investigative Grand Jury - a
Grand Jury to investigate al Qaeda or the threat of terrorist attacks in the United States - and
ask questions about al Qaeda, its organization, its activities or, more generally, about terrorist
attacks. A witness before a Grand Jury has the right to invoke the privilege against self-
incrimination if the answer "might" incriminate him. 66 The CDB, or another terrorist, might do so,
even if he is not given Miranda warnings; but he might not. Moreover, if he does invoke the
privilege against self-incrimination, the United States Attorney could give him use immunity 67 -
which means that only the answers he gives and any evidence obtained as a result cannot be
used against him.
V. THE MONTREAL CONVENTION
Lastly, an attempt to blow up an airplane is a violation of the Montreal Convention on
Airplane Sabotage, 68 which the United States has ratified.69 Under that Convention several States
have jurisdiction to try the alleged offender: the State in whose territory the act is committed; the
State in which the airplane is registered; the State of nationality of the offender; and the State in
which he is found.70 The Convention provides that the State in which he is found is obligated to
61 U.S. CONST. amend. V, cl. 3.
62 See United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564, 572 (1976) (plurality opinion) ("The [Fifth Amendment]
privilege cannot ... be asserted by a witness to protect others from possible criminal prosecution.' (citing
Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367, 371 (1951), which held that the privilege against self-incrimination is
"solely for the benefit of the witness,' and is 'purely a personal privilege of the witness") (internal footnotes
omitted)).
63 See, e.g., United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 345 (1974) (' [T]he power of a federal court to compel
persons to appear and testify before a grand jury is ... firmly established.") (citing Kastigar v. United States,
406 U.S. 441, 443 (1972)).
64 See United States v. Wilson, 421 U.S. 309, 316 (1975) (holding in contempt two witnesses who refused to
testify and stating that the 'face-to-face refusal to comply with the court's order itself constituted an affront
to the court, and when that kind of refusal disrupts and frustrates an ongoing proceeding ... summary
contempt must be available to vindicate the authority of the court . . .") (internal footnote omitted).
65 See Mandujano, 425 U.S. at 579 (holding Miranda warnings inapplicable to Grand Jury testimony).
66 Calandra, 414 U.S. at 346.
67 See Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 453 (1972) ('Immunity from the use of compelled testimony, as
well as evidence derived directly and indirectly therefrom ... prohibits the prosecutorial authorities from
using the compelled testimony in any respect, and it therefore insures that the testimony cannot lead to
the infliction of criminal penalties on the witness.").
68 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation, ratified by the United
States Nov. 1, 1972, 24 U.S.T. 564, 974 U.N.T.S. 178, available at http://treaties.un.org/doc/db/Terrorism/
Conv3-english.pdf.
69 Id. at 178 n.1.
70 Id. art. 5(1) ("Each Contracting State shall take such measures as may be necessary to establish its
jurisdiction over the offences in the following cases: (a) when the offence is committed in the territory of
that State; (b) when the offence is committed against or on board an aircraft registered in that State ...
."); art. 5(2) ('Each Contracting State shall likewise take such measures as may be necessary to establish its
jurisdiction over the offences ... in the case where the alleged offender is present in its territory... .").
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try him or to extradite him to another State that has jurisdiction. 1 Since most States do not
exclude incriminating statements elicited without Miranda warnings, the United States might
have the option of extraditing him to another State that would not be barred from using his
incriminating statements; whether the United States would choose to do so would, of course,
depend on a number of factors. It is not suggested that the United States do so, particularly not
in cases such as that of the CDB, where there is unquestionably sufficient evidence to convict
without using any self-incriminating statements he might have made, but only that it should not
be ruled out in advance for all cases.
The United States has been criticized for sending suspects to countries where they were
tortured.7 2 The two situations are not analogous. Failure to give Miranda warnings is not
comparable to engaging in torture. Torture is a crime under the domestic law of most states,7 3
including the United States,7 4 and a violation of a treaty ratified by 147 States,75 including the
United States.76 Use of incriminating statements elicited without Miranda warnings is not a crime,
nor a violation of international law.
VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
In sum, a suspect in custody may be questioned without being given Miranda warnings,
though use of the evidence obtained as a result of such questioning at the trial may be barred. 7
In the case of a terrorist, such as the CDB, the evidence obtained would probably be admissible
under the public safety exception of Quarles. 78 Indeed, the CDB case is a far more compelling
case for application of the public safety exception than the Quarles case, in which it was
71 Id. art. 7 ('The Contracting State in the territory of which the alleged offender is found shall, if it does not
extradite him, be obliged, without exception whatsoever and whether or not the offence was committed
in its territory, to submit the case to its component authorities for the purpose of prosecution. Those
authorities shall take their decision in the same manner as in the case of any ordinary offence of a serious
nature under the law of that State."); art. 8(1) ('The offences shall be deemed to be included as
extraditable offences in any extradition treaty existing between Contracting States. Contracting States
undertake to include the offences as extraditable offences in every extradition treaty to be concluded
between them.').
72 See Douglas Jeh| & David Johnston, Rule Change Lets C.I.A. Freely Send Suspects Abroad to Jails, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 6, 2005, http://www.nytimes.com/2005/03/06/politics/06intel.html (last visited Nov. 1, 2010)
(' [F]ormer government officials say that since the Sept. 11 attacks, the C.I.A. has flown 100 to 150
suspected terrorists from one foreign country to another, including to Egypt, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Jordan and
Pakistan. Each of those countries has been identified by the State Department as habitually using torture in
its prisons ... [and that these programs] ha[ve] been bitterly criticized by human rights groups.").
73 See, e.g., Canada Criminal Code, R.S.C., ch. C-46 § 269.1 (1985) (defining torture in accordance with the
definition contained in Article 1 of the Convention Against Torture and stating that any statement obtained
as a result of torture is inadmissible as evidence in any proceeding over which the Canadian Parliament
has jurisdiction); Schweizerisches Strafgesetzbuch [StGB], Swiss Criminal Code, Dec. 21,1937, art. 264a
(Switz.) as amended by Gesetz, Pct. 4, 1991, AS 2465 (1992), art. 264a (f) (defining torture as 'inflict[ing]
severe pain or suffering or a serious injury, whether physical or mental, on a person in his or her custody or
under his or her control"); Code p6nal [C. p6n.] art. 212-1 (Fr.) (making torture punishable by life
imprisonment); Nihonkoku Kenp5 [Kenp5] [Constitution], art. 36 (Japan) ("The infliction of torture by any
public officer and cruel punishments are absolutely forbidden.").
74 See 18 U.S.C. § 2340.
75 Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10.
1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85, 113 (entered into force June 26, 1987), available at http://www.state.gov/documents
/organization/100296.pdf. The Convention has 147 parties as of Apr. 2, 2011.
76 
Id.
77 See supra notes 28-31, 36-47 and accompanying text.
78 See supra notes 24, 26-27 and accompanying text.
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established. But, even if the evidence would not be admissible, in terrorist cases acquiring further
intelligence may well be more important than reading the suspect the Miranda warnings, to
ensure that if he makes any incriminating statements they would be admissible at trial. At
present Justice Department policy and the FBI Manual and Guidelines interpret the public safety
exception narrowly and require FBI agents to give Miranda warnings prior to questioning a
suspect in custody, without weighing the need for ensuring that the evidence will be admissible
at trial against the importance of acquiring further intelligence. 7 Whatever the pros and cons of
this policy with respect to routine investigations, it should be reconsidered and changed with
respect to those suspected of terrorist attacks.
The government also has the option of getting further information about the terrorist
organization and attacks being planned by questioning the suspect before an investigative
Grand Jury, with or without use immunity.80 Lastly, if evidence was obtained without Miranda
warnings in a case where the public safety exception does not apply - very unlikely in the case
of terrorist attacks - and that evidence is necessary for conviction, the United States might
consider extraditing him to another State that has jurisdiction under the applicable treaty and
does not bar use of such evidence.81
VII. EPILOGUE
In May 2010, the Attorney General stated that the government would ask Congress to
enact legislation to permit FBI agents to question terrorist suspects without giving Miranda
warnings and that this was "a new priority for the administration." 82 In an interview on Meet The
Press, Mr. Holder said:
MR. HOLDER: We want to work with Congress to come up with a way in which we make our
public safety exception more flexible and, again, more consistent with the threat
that we face. And yes, this is, in fact, big news. This is a proposal that we're going
to be making and that we want to work with Congress about.
MR. GREGORY: So a new priority for the administration.
MR. HOLDER: It is a new priority.83
In the many months that have elapsed since the Attorney General's statements, no such
legislation has been enacted.84 While such legislation might be politically helpful, it is not legally
79 See supra notes 52-53, 55 and accompanying text.
so See supra Part IV.
81 See supra Part V.
82 On May 9, 2010, Attorney General Eric Holder, on ABC's "This Week' and on NBC's "Meet the Press,'
stated that the Obama administration is open to modifying Miranda protections to deal with the "threat[s]
that we now face." Holder continued, "I think we have to give serious consideration to at least modifying
that public safety exception." "That's one of the things that I think we're going to be reaching out to
Congress to do, to come up with a proposal that is both constitutional, but that is also relevant to our time
and the threat that we now face." Charlie Savage, Holder Backs a Miranda Limit for Terror Suspects, N.Y.
TIMES, May 9, 2010, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/10/us/politics/10holder.html (last visited
Mar. 7,2011); Anne E. Kornblut, Obama Administration Looks into Modifying Miranda Law in the Age of
Terrorism, WASH. POST, May 10, 2010, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/
article/2010/05/09/AR2010050902062.html (last visited Mar. 7, 2011).
83 Transcript of Eric Holder Interview, Meet the Press (May 9, 2010), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/
37024384/ns/meet the-press/page/2/.
84 Two bills were proposed in Congress following the Attorney General's statements. On May 27, 2010,
Kansas Congressman Todd Tiahrt proposed H.R. 1413, entitled "Expressing the sense of the House of
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necessary. The Justice Department has apparently come to the same conclusion. 85 An FBI
memorandum dated October 21, 2010, but first made public March 24, 2011,86 states,
In light of the magnitude and complexity of the threat often posed by terrorist
organizations, particularly international terrorist organizations, and the nature of their
attacks, the circumstances surrounding an arrest of an operational terrorist may warrant
significantly more extensive public safety interrogation without Miranda warnings than
would be permissible in an ordinary criminal case.87
Representatives that the holding in Miranda v. Arizona may be interpreted to provide for the admissibility of
a terrorist suspect's responses in an interrogation without administration of the Miranda warnings, to the
extent that the interrogation is carried out to acquire information concerning other threats to public
safety.' H.R. Res. 1413, 111th Cong., 2d Sess. (2010). The bill stated,
[I]t is [the] sense of the House of Representatives that the "public safety"'exception announced in
New York v. Quares . . . may be interpreted such that the responses of a person interrogated in
connection with an act of terrorism who has not been administered the warnings described in
Miranda are admissible as evidence against that person in a criminal prosecution, to the extent that
the interrogation is carried out because of a reasonable concern that the person has information
about other threats to public safety.
Id. The bill was referred to the Subcommittee on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties on July 26,
2010. The proposed bill was cleared from the books when the 111th Congressional Session ended. On July
29, 2010, California Congressman Adam Schiff proposed H.R. 5934, entitled "Questioning of Terrorism
Suspects Act of 2010.' H. Res. 5934, 111th Cong., 2d Sess. (2010). The bill stated,
It is the sense of Congress that the public safety exception to the constitutional requirement for what
are commonly called Miranda warnings allows unwarned interrogation of terrorism suspects for as
long as is necessary to protect the public from pending or planned attacks when a significant purpose
of the interrogation is to gather intelligence and not solely to elicit testimonial evidence.. . .
In the case of an individual who is a terrorism suspect, upon ex parte application made by the
Government within 6 hours immediately following the person's arrest or other detention, that individual
may be taken before a magistrate not later than 48 hours after arrest or other detention and any
confession made within those 48 hours shall not be considered inadmissible solely because the
individual was not presented to a magistrate earlier.
Id. The bill was referred to both the Subcommittee on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties and
the Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security on Sept. 20, 2010. The proposed bill was
cleared from the books when the 111th Congressional Session ended. Prior to the Attorney General's
statements, Senators John McCain and Joe Lieberman introduced S. 3081, the "Enemy Belligerent
Interrogation, Detention, and Prosecution Act of 2010." S. 3081, 111th Cong., 2nd Sess. (2010). The bill
proposed requiring an individual suspected of engaging in hostilities against the United States or its
coalition partners through an act of terrorism who may be an unprivileged enemy belligerent to be placed
in military custody for purposes of initial interrogation and determination of status. The proposed bill would
have allowed the detention and interrogation of such individuals for a reasonable time after capture or
coming into custody and defines "unprivileged enemy belligerent" as an individual who: (1) has engaged
in hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners; (2) has purposely and materially supported
hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners; or (3) was a part of al Qaeda at the time of
capture. Id. This bill was also cleared from the books when the 111th Congressional Session ended.
8s See Charlie Savage, Delayed Miranda Warning Ordered for Terror Suspects, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 24, 2011,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/25/us/25miranda.html (last visited Apr. 2, 2011); Evan Perez,
Rights Are Curtailed for Terror Suspects, WALL STREET JOURNAL, Mar. 24, 2011, available at http://online.wsj.com
/article/SB10001424052748704050204576218970652119898.html (last visited Apr. 2, 2011).
86 An FBI internal memorandum, dated Oct. 21, 2010 - which, according to the New York Times, the Justice
Department had earlier refused to make public - was quoted in the Wall Street Journal and the New York
Times on March 24, 2011. See Savage, supra note 85. The New York Times article states that, following the
publication of the Wall Street Journal article, the Times "obtained access to a full copy" of the
memorandum. Id. The article does not state whether access was provided by the Justice Department or
the New York Times "obtained access" through other means. See id.
87 FBI Memorandum, Terrorists in the United States (Oct. 21, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/25/
us/25miranda-text.html (last visited Apr. 2, 2011) ("In these instances, agents should seek SAC approval to
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The memorandum instructs FBI agents to "ask any and all questions that are reasonably
prompted by an immediate concern for the safety of the public or the arresting agents without
advising the arrestee of his Miranda rights."88
It goes on to say,
There may be exceptional cases in which, although all relevant public safety questions
have been asked, agents nonetheless conclude that continued unwarned interrogation is
necessary to collect valuable and timely intelligence not related to any immediate threat,
and that the government's interest in obtaining this intelligence outweighs the
disadvantages of proceeding with unwarned interrogation.89
It is difficult to understand why it took the government almost a year to reach these
conclusions, and not at all clear why it initially refused to release the information. But, at least it
will no longer bar questioning terrorists engaged in or attempting attacks on the United States
and risk losing information that might save countless lives based on the Supreme Court's decision
in Miranda. 90
proceed with unwarned interrogation after the public safety questioning is concluded. Whenever feasible,




90 Editor's Note: On October 12, 2011, Abdulmutallab unexpectedly pled guilty to all federal charges,
following the prosecution's opening statement at trial. For a discussion of the Miranda issue in light of the
guilty plea, see Charlie Savage, Developments Rekindle Debate Over Best Approach for Terrorism Suspects,
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